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choice between two undesirable results: either to place the title and mortgage guar-
antee creditors of this company in a better position than similar creditors of other title
and mortgage companies not engaged in the banking business, or to place them in a
relatively worse position by allowing diversion of the assets of the company into the
hands of the banking and trust creditors.'4 In order to place the title and mortgage
guarantee creditors in a position to enforce double liability, the court was forced to a
questionable interpretation of the applicable procedural provisions of the Banking
Law,2s by which exclusive authority to enforce double liability is vested in the Superin-
tendent of Banks.26 It may be suggested that by use of the doctrine of subrogation, the
title and mortgage guarantee creditors of the company would have been provided a
sounder basis of protection, while at the same time the stockholders would have been
protected by the use of a measure of recovery more commensurate with the actual
loss.27
Criminal Law-Grand Jury-Voluntary Communications to Grand Jury as
Criminal Contempt.-[llinois].-The defendant wrote two inflammatory letters to the
regularly impanelled grand jury in which he offered to present on oath evidence of a
conspiracy among the state's attorney, the county assessor, and a newspaper to de-
fraud the state of revenue. Upon the filing of an information prepared by the state's
attorney, incorporating the letters, the defendant was adjudged guilty of criminal con-
tempt. On appeal, held, that the communication voluntarily made to the grand jury
obstructed the due administration of justice and was therefore a contempt of court.
People v. Parker.'
While, with the institution of public agencies for the prosecution of crime, the early
common law power' of the grand jury to prefer indictments at the instance of private
24 See Pink v. Alden, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 365, 368 (App. Div. 194o).
as N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, §§ 8o, 1x3-a.
26 The court in the instant case avoided the procedural difficulty as follows: a creditor of
a bank or trust company holding an unsatisfied judgment may bring suit to enforce the double
liability provisions when the Superintendent of Banks has possession and fails or refuses to
bring suit. In the instant case the Superintendent of Banks could not have possession because
the company was already in the possession of the Superintendent of Insurance, and the credi-
tors could not obtain judgment because all creditors' actions were enjoined by the court in the
rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings. Since the performance of these conditions is there-
fore impossible, the creditors are excused from performance thereof, and may bring suit. Pink
v. Alden, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 365, 370 (App. Div. i940). This reasoning was of course based on the
assumption that the creditors were to be viewed as creditors of a banking and trust company.
27 The advantage gained by the title and mortgage guarantee creditors through the acquisi-
tion of power to enforce double liability in their own right may prove more theoretical than
actual in the present case, since the deficiency of banking assets in relation to banking claims
may prove to exceed the $2,ooo,ooo par value of the outstanding stock, which is the upper limit
of recovery under any theory.
' 3o N.E. (2d) ix (Ill. i94o).
2Thompson and Merriam, Juries § 6og (1882); Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 247, 174 Eng.
Rep. R. 492 (1841); In re Opinion to the Governor, 4 A. (2d) 487 (R.I. 1939). For statutory
provisions in various states see American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (with
commentaries) 484 (1931).
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prosecutors has been removed in some states by judicial decision,3 the early common
law rule still exists in Illinois.4 Where the early common law rule is still in force there
are several reasons for retaining the possibility of subjecting a private person to pun-
ishment for bringing charges before a grand jury in a particular case. The charges
may serve to influence the result in a proceeding already before the grand jury, and
any attempt so to influence it is generally held to be an interference punishable as a
contempt.5 Likewise the charges may have a tendency to divert the grand jury from
cases regularly presented to it, and this too would seem to be a contempt.6 Finally
the grand jury may be completely occupied with previously planned work.7
The foregoing reasons, however, are of less weight with reference to the giving of
information regarding offenses of public officials than with reference to misconduct of
private persons. Offenses of private persons can be adequately prosecuted without
giving the private prosecutor direct access to the grand jury; if the police and public
prosecutor refuse to act, the magistrate's warrant with the resulting examination is
adequate. The grand jury, however, is the only law enforcement agency in a position
to investigate the activities of public officers. Such investigation is beyond the scope
of normal police activity, and the magistrate does not possess the broad investigatory
powers necessary to cope with these offenses.' The grand jury, whose place in the
3 McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870); State v. Love, 23 Tenn. 255 (1843).
See also Justice Field's Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Gas. No. 18255 (C.C. Cal. 1870). Com-
pare, however, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 63 (i9o6), where the court quotes from Frisbie v.
United States, YL57 U.S. i6o, 163 (1895), the following: ..... it is for the grand jury to in-
vestigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them ..... " See Kidd,
Why Grand Jury's Power Is a Menace to Organized Crime, 12 Panel 32 (1934), for a con-
demnation of cases deviating from common law rule.
In some jurisdictions the grand jury has been largely eliminated. For the relative position
of the grand jury in the criminal justice procedure of the United States, see statutes collected
in American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (with commentaries) 414 (I93i);
Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, io Ore. L. Rev. Ioi, 122 (193I). The grand jury
has been recently abolished in England. Lieck, Abolition of Grand Jury in England, 25 J.
Crim. Law 623 (1934).
4 See People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 208, i81 N.E. 617, 619 (1932); People v. Graydon,
333 111. 429, 433, 164 N.E. 832, 834 (1929); Pankey v. People, 2 Ill. 79 (833) (grand jury in-
vestigation instituted by private citizen held illegal on other grounds). In the instant case the
court did not in terms reverse the common law rule.
sHitzelberger v. State, 173 Md. 435, i96 Atl. 288 (1938); Commonwealth v. McNary,
246 Mass. 46, I4o N.E. 255 (1923).
6 See 2 Wharton, Criminal Procedure § 1264 (ioth ed. ig8). Courts have divided on this
question: held to be illegal in Commonwealth ex rel. Jack v. Crans, 2 Clark (Pa.) 172 (Quart.
Sess. 1844); United States v. Kilpatrick, x6 Fed. 765 (D.C. N.C. 1883); held to be permissible
conduct in State v. Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 14 So. 143 (1893); King v. Second Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. of Saginaw, 234 Ala. io6, 173 So. 498 (1937); Hott v. Yarborough, 112 Tex.
179, 245 S.W. 676 (I922). It is a statutory offense in federal courts. 35 Stat. 1113 (I909),
i8 U.S.C.A. § 241 (1927). See Duke v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 840 (C.C.A. 4 th 1937).
7 The grand jury in many jurisdictions already has more cases than it can adequately con-
sider. See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement [Wickersham
Commission], Report on Prosecution 36 (i93I).
8 People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 79 N.E. 330 (igo6). See Dession and
Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 Yale LJ. 687 (1932).
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prosecution of routine offenses has been much criticized,9 has special advantages in
the investigation and the prosecution of the conduct of public officers. xo It may begin
its investigation without the showing of probable cause necessary to a magistrate's in-
vestigation, and as a result its investigations are not confined within the limits of a
definite charge. It can pursue its activities in secret and is not dependent upon a pub-
lic officer. It may be true that the force of public opinion would prevent punishment
of the informer in cases where there was no personal malice such as was evidenced
by the defendant's letters in the instant case.- Nevertheless, it would seem that the
decision in the present case will operate as a severe restriction upon the giving of aid
by private persons in the prosecution of offenses of public officials.X
On the other hand, allowing citizens to present information as to crimes of public
officials to a grand jury might tend to cause the grand jury to become a political
weapon, and large scale investigation of the activities of public officials might seriously
cripple the normal operation of the government. 3 These problems suggest the desir-
ability of the plan urged by the Wickersham Report and adopted in some states: 4 a
grand jury which would meet at regular intervals for the express purpose of investigat-
ing the conduct of public officers. Thus the desired prosecution of malfeasance in office
could be had without the intervention of a private prosecutor and the difficulties and
dangers which such intervention entails.
Elections-Absent Voter Statute-Challenge of Absent Voter's Electoral Qualifica-
tions-[Kansas].-The plaintiff was a candidate for governor in the 1940 general elec-
tion. While the State Board of Canvassers x was counting the ballots mailed in by
9 Scragg, The Grand Jury, 2 Temple L.Q. 317, 319 (1928); Chamberlain, Correspond-
ence, 5 Panel 3 (1927); National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement [Wicker-
sham Commission], Report on Prosecution 36, 124 (i93i); cf. Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the
Grand Jury, 22 J. Crim. Law 692 (1932).
xo Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Public Officials, io St. John'sL.
Rev. 219 (1936); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, io Ore. L. Rev. 295, 333 (1931);
Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution 145 (1929).
"I See an Illinois case reported in Davis, The Grand Jury 4-5 (193), where the representa-
tive of a civic organization presented evidence of malfeasance to a grand jury. The state's
attorney prepared an information charging contempt of court. The case attracted wide news-
paper publicity and the court finally discharged the defendant.
2 That the first prerequisite of efficient law enforcement is honest, competent officials has
been attested repeatedly. Waite, Criminal Law in Action c. xvii (I934); Morse, A Survey
of the Grand Jury System, io Ore. L. Rev. 295, 365 (i93i); Puttkammer, Criminal Law
Enforcement, 33 University of Chicago Magazine 12 (194o). The office of public prose-
cutor in particular must remain uncorrupted because of its position as the gateway to criminal
prosecution. Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution, c. iii (1929); Cockrell, Successful
Justice 244 (1939).
13 See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498 (1936).
'4 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement [Wickersham Commission],
Report on Prosecution 37 (1931); see American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure
(with commentaries) 488 (i93i), for citations to state statutes; cf. Proposed Illinois Criminal
Code, pt. iv (I937).
x Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) §§ 25-707, 25-l1o9, qualifying Kan. Const. art. i,
